I ask my private pilot candidates this when the weather is unstable or marginal VFR and falling. If they determine the weather does not support the mission, they need to explain why they came to that decision.

Developing personal minimums and learning to make the go/no-go decision is an essential part of their training. Developing that skill set can be tough to do when you are being pressured by a CFI intent on accumulating hours or a flight school with a policy that seemingly requires flight operations that would be below personal minimums for many pilots.

For example, a recent weather cancellation policy memo from L3Harris Flight Academy, based at Orlando Sanford International Airport (KSFB) in Florida, started burning up the blogosphere, as it dictates that the weather must be below certain criteria before a flight can be canceled or penalties would be levied.

The cross-country flight minimum of visibility of 3 sm and the ceiling of 2,000 feet stated in the memo is generating the most discussion, due in part to the definition of Marginal VFR as ceiling 1,000 to 3,000 feet and/or visibility 3 to 5 miles inclusive. The minima in the memo puts the aircraft in MVFR and well below the minimum altitude for 91.159 VFR cruising altitudes. The chance of a collision with other aircraft and obstacles down low increases because it puts the cross-country pilot down among those doing maneuvers. 

There are L3Harris minima published for the cancellation of IFR flights as well. If the weather is equal to the lowest approach minimums at KSFB (there are three ILS approaches, so the aircraft can use those minimums that would take the aircraft down to 200 feet above ground) the flight is supposed to take place.

L3Harris is a Part 141 school and a pilot pipeline, ostensibly designed to create airline pilots as quickly and efficiently as possible. If the airplanes are not in the air, they don’t generate revenue, and the learners don’t progress in their training. It is frustrating and wasteful when a client no-shows or cancels at the last minute, but pushing these minima, and having the CFIs push them as company policy may be counterproductive to the creation of safe pilots.

FLYING was provided with a copy of the L3Harris memo from pilots concerned about it “sending the wrong message” and “encouraging scud running,” in addition to creating an atmosphere of extra pressure for both the pilots in training and the instructors.

The June 12 memo said: “To accurately predict equipment availability and efficiency in the schedule, we are adopting a new cancellation policy. If the weather conditions are at or better than the limitations, a cancellation is considered non-excusable.”

According to social media posts from people representing themselves as former or current clients or CFIs at L3Harris, the school allegedly requires the pilots to arrive at school an hour before flight time, and cancellations must be done in person, or the client is charged a $250 no-show fee. 

The memo continues by encouraging the pilots to “be creative in your plan of action,” such as “changing routes to avoid deteriorating weather or thunderstorms. Be sure to use all available weather resources including but not limited to: local news reports, aviationweather.gov, ForeFlight, etc. In the event your flying proficiency does not meet the current weather, please speak with your Training Group Manager concerning a plan of action.

“No flights shall be flown in the area of a convective SIGMET without the approval of the chief flight instructor or their designee. All thunderstorms must be avoided by a margin consistent with safety. All severe thunderstorms should be avoided by at least 20 nm.”

Thunderstorms are often a daily occurrence in the Sunshine State yet “severe thunderstorms” was not defined. Last September in Kentucky we saw the fatal result of a CFI continuing a flight into approaching thunderstorms. Departing an airport in marginal weather limits the pilot’s options should the weather begin or continue to deteriorate.

• READ MORE: NTSB Preliminary Report on Kentucky Fatal Crash Released

The memo has been the topic of discussion at FAA safety meetings. The most common question was, “Is this legal in the eyes of the FAA?” 

FLYING contacted the FAA and the agency replied: “VFR weather minimums are in Parts 91.155 and 91.157. Flight schools operating under Part 61 must comply with these minima. Flight schools operating under Part 141 may have additional minima established by their FAA Flight Standards District Office as part of their training curriculum.”

Legally, the L3Harris memo complies with FAA regulations. Is it an exercise in good judgment and aeronautical decision-making? I don’t believe so, and I am not the only one. 

“Imposing mandatory weather minimums for student flight dispatch—to expedite flight training efficiency and protect profit margins—is both dangerous and counterproductive to building essential weather judgment,” said David St. George, executive director of the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators and a DPE. “This industrial flight training methodology, to improve dispatch rates, destroys the central focus of the FAA ACS—personal risk management.”

Added Karen Kalishek, chair of the National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI): “NAFI has two primary areas of concern regarding L3Harris Flight Academy’s published weather policy regarding non-excusable cancellations: One, There are many instances in which weather quickly deteriorates, and the L3Harris stated weather minima provide little margin for pilots to escape potentially decreasing ceilings and/or visibility, and two, imposed weather minimums are inconsistent with the FAA’s intent that pilots should develop personal minimums that reflect their individual levels of proficiency and experience.

“The policy provides for a pilot to assess their personal proficiency and speak to a manager for an alternative plan of action. However, the ‘non-excusable’ terminology supports application of the default minimums.”

Attempts to find out if L3Harris operates with “additional minima established by their FAA Flight Standards District Office” were not successful, despite sending multiple emails and placing phone calls to the local FSDO and David Krug Jr., who signed the memo as the L3Harris chief flight instructor/head of flight training. 

When FLYING reached Krug, he said he was aware the flight academy weather cancellation memo was a topic of conversation in the pilot blogosphere, adding, “I cannot speak to internal information. I am not going to say anything. We are addressing it internally. I understand the situation.”

There were multiple posts on social media from individuals who contacted the Orlando FSDO to report the perceived safety issues. A few posted the emails they received from the FSDO in reply, stating that their concerns were logged and an investigator had been or would be assigned. A check of the signature on the email corresponds to the Orlando FSDO employee directory.

According to the FAA, the agency does investigate safety concerns but “does not confirm or comment on investigations.”

Risk Part of Flight Training

Flight safety is about managing risk. The FAA’s Risk Management Handbook explores how pilots should evaluate risk, and that includes establishing personal weather minimums.

In Chapter 2, it states, “federal regulations that apply to aviation do not cover every situation nor do they guarantee safety,” noting that “pilots who understand the difference between what is ‘smart’ or ‘safe’ based on pilot experience and proficiency establish personal minimums that are more restrictive than the regulatory requirements.”

Flight instructors are often the gatekeepers of personal minima—done in the form of limitations on a learner’s solo endorsement.

For example, the initial solo endorsement I give lists weather for flight in the pattern as 3 miles visibility and a 3,000 foot ceiling, and for the practice area, 5 miles of visibility. A weather briefing is a requirement as well. Crosswinds are limited to 6 knots, and that limitation is lifted and increased as the learner’s experience grows.

For the initial cross-country flights, visibility increases to 10 miles and the ceiling to 5,000 feet. After I review their flight plan, the trip-specific endorsement includes noting “weather checked as of (insert time).” 

I wouldn’t feel comfortable or responsible sending a learner out solo on a cross-country flight with 3 miles visibility and a 2,000-foot ceiling as noted in the L3Harris minima. 

There Is a Time and a Place

Personal weather minima is a fluid concept. It’s good to go out and stretch those skills from time to time with a CFI onboard. It can be a beneficial learning experience.

Weather minima are often dictated not only by the pilot’s experience but also proficiency and the mission. You probably wouldn’t take your non-flying, airplane-shy significant other up on a day with gusting crosswinds or turbulence.

A CFI (personally or by virtue of company policy) shouldn’t be pressuring the learner into making the flight, but it happens. Especially when the CFI and or company only gets paid when the propeller is turning.

Sometimes, the decision not to fly is the best choice. But it needs to be a choice and not something the client is financially penalized for.

The post Weather Minimums Memo at Florida Flight School Generates Controversy appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The FAA bill initially passed the House in July, but the agency’s existing authorization has since been extended twice because of debates in the Senate ranging from aviation to global politics. December was a particularly chaotic time with senators using their valuable pre-holiday time to talk about border security and aid to Ukraine and Israel. They hoped to debate the list of FAA-related items over the past two weeks. However, the Boeing 737 Max 9 midair door plug incident and concerns over the FAA’s diversity and inclusion hiring plans have dominated the media and absorbed attention. Discussions around the FAA bill are now expected to take place in February. 

The overall aim of the bill is to help improve aviation technologies and the workforce by improving FAA efficiency and operations, growing the aviation workforce, upholding America’s gold standard in safety, and encouraging aviation innovation. More specifically, there has been debate around several key issues, including raising the mandatory pilot retirement age from 65 to 67 and increasing the simulator hours a pilot can log as part of the 1,500 hours needed to become an airline transport pilot. In November, Senator John Thune (R-S.D) put forth a compromise proposal to increase loggable simulator hours from 100 to 150.

As part of the National Flight Training Alliance (NFTA), made up of American leaders in the pilot training space, I believe that good will come from raising the simulator hours. 

The simulators of 2024 are not a 1990s DOS-run PC flight simulators with a joystick. The latest advanced simulators often contain an exact replica of a specific aircraft with the same avionics and controls you will find in a real airplane. This enables pilots to practice a whole range of skills, from teamwork and communication to aircraft systems and actual stick and rudder flying, if needed. Moreover, advancements in recent simulator technology, particularly in computer software and graphics, have pushed the immersion and data collection to a whole new level. The advanced data-driven training systems enable pilots and instructors to receive real-time insights and standardized evaluations for continuous pilot training improvement. This is important because efficient and economical performance evaluation is critical to the aviation industry.

These simulations promote the use of critical and evaluative thinking. Events in newer high-fidelity simulators enable students to enthusiastically contemplate the implications of a given scenario. This is vital, especially in recreating and practicing emergency procedures and scenarios, which you don’t want to do in the aircraft. Furthermore, scientific studies, including high-level, peer-reviewed journal articles on human factors, have shown that adding in unpredictability and variability into simulator training sessions improves pilot responses. It requires the pilot to apply the practiced skills and reinforces learning.

Another often overlooked benefit of simulators is teaching in one. The Roman philosopher Seneca said, “When we teach, we learn.” Scientific studies have proven this is true—teaching a topic to your student helps the teacher learn. It’s known as the “protégé effect.” NFTA board members, who include FAA Part 141/161 flight school owners and their CFIs, can attest to this. Many of us view the flight time while teaching, especially in a simulator, as superior compared to other more uneventful and repetitious methods allowed for logging flight experience. 

One can write a full-length book on this “flight training” topic, and if you did, it would be imperative to include the expertise and experience of the individuals involved in the day-to-day flight school world. This FAA bill shouldn’t be any different. It is these individuals who train the private pilots who eventually become commercial pilots who feed the airlines and other institutions. They know that time in an advanced flight simulator is highly beneficial to student pilots and instructors. They see raising the loggable simulator hours from 100 to 150 as a step in the right direction. 

Overall, now is the ideal time to modernize and update flight training in America. The pilot shortage, combined with often outdated and inefficient regulations, makes it vital that the final version of the Securing Growth and Robust Leadership in American Aviation Act allows for innovation in aircraft simulation and education. Aviation is critical to our country’s national infrastructure. This bill will provide industry and FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker with guidance on the next five years—and beyond. 

The post U.S. Senate Has Until Early March to Finalize FAA Reauthorization Bill appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

We start with the sad, as I wrote several stories about aircraft accidents this year. Often, my airport children (pilots I have trained or mentored) reach out to me when something happens, but we wait to publish anything on these until the NTSB releases its preliminary report. I often interview witnesses, but there will be no speculation. This is a rule.

I approach all of these stories wearing my flight instructor cap. I submit there has to be something to learn from the misfortune of others. This year, I wrote a lot about midair accidents. 

I had several friends at Reno this year, watching the last Reno Air Races. A few of them are lifers, going to the event every year since they were children. Some work in the pits. A few witnessed the collision of the T-6s Baron’s Revenge and Six Cat. Others witnessed the aftermath. One told me how he struggled to explain what had happened to his kids. I think we can all agree it was a horrible way to end the air races at Reno.

Florida Midair

At approximately 2 p.m. on March 7, 2023, there was the collision of a Piper Cherokee and a Piper J-3 Cub on floats at Winter Haven Regional Airport (KGIF) in Florida, that killed four people: two CFIs and two learners. Both were in their respective patterns—the pilot of the Cherokee was attempting a poweroff 180-degree landing to Runway 29, and the Cub was attempting to land at Jack Brown’s Seaplane Base (F57).

20-plus years of experience as a CFI has given me a very healthy respect for see-and-avoid, and expect the unexpected—especially in the pattern, that is so often crowded with pilots of varying abilities. This one was my worst nightmare, especially when I learned the pilot of the Cherokee was a commercial student attending the aviation program at Polk State College. I know people who teach there.

The pilot of the Piper J-3 Cub on floats was also on an instructional flight. As the preliminary NTSB report noted, the J-3 was not equipped with a radio, and radio communications were not required in that airspace, which is Class Echo. The NTSB noted the pilot of the Cherokee announced a left turn to the base leg of the traffic pattern; then the aircraft collided nearly head-on at an altitude of approximately 575 feet msl. The NTSB is still investigating.

Airshow Collision Lawsuit

The November 12, 2022 midair collision of the B-17 Texas Raiders and the P-63 Kingcobra that took the lives of six during the Wings Over Dallas Airshow came back in 2023 when a lawsuit was filed against the Commemorative Air Force, the organizers of the show, on behalf of the family of Len Root, the B-17 pilot. The lawsuit was filed on the grounds of alleged negligence because, according to the NTSB, no altitude deconfliction procedures were briefed before the flight or applied when the airplanes were in the air. 

The lawsuit also names air boss Russell Royce as a defendant for alleged failure to maintain control of the flight paths of the aircraft involved. Altitude deconfliction procedures are established in the event pilots find themselves at an improper altitude during the flight. Several photographs and videos of the event from multiple angles show the P-63 in a turn, coming up behind the B-17 turning with its belly facing the bomber, then colliding with it, slicing the bigger aircraft in half.

McSpadden Accident

When I write about accidents, it involves studying the airport diagrams and the NTSB preliminary report, often recreating the environment that led to the event in an Redbird FMX AATD. It is my attempt to understand what happened, as written in the preliminary report.

When I wrote about one in Florida that was attributed to spatial disorientation caused by a blackhole departure, I duct-taped a black curtain over the entry to the cab of the FMX. I needed a zero-light situation to see what the pilot saw.

I shared this with Richard McSpadden Jr., who was AOPA’s vice president of safety, and often studied and commented on accidents for AOPA’s Air Safety Institute. I often reached out to him for his insights, as we shared the same philosophy about learning from accidents. I had tremendous respect for him, not only for his work with ASI, but also for his experience as a member of the USAF Thunderbirds. We often discussed how instructors could better prepare their learners to avoid these events.

That ended on October 1 when McSpadden and former NFL tight end turned FBO owner Russ Francis were killed attempting to return to Lake Placid Airport (KLKP) in New York. The Cessna Cardinal RG they were flying developed an engine issue shortly after takeoff. Witnesses told the NTSB that the engine sounded as if it was surging. Someone onboard the Cardinal radioed they were returning because of a problem.

The purpose of the flight was to do a photo mission for AOPA. The photo aircraft, a Beechcraft A36, took off first. Per company procedure for photo flights, the pilot/owner of the subject aircraft (Francis) was to fly the airplane during the takeoff, climb-out and landing, and after joining up in formation, the pilot-rated passenger (McSpadden) would take over the controls and fly the airplane, as photo shoots require formation flying.

The airport is on a plateau. There is a single runway, 14/22, measuring 4,196 feet long and 60 feet wide. There are several obstructions, including trees, which according to the NTSB preliminary report measure 77-feet-high located 884 feet from the runway, and 334 feet left of centerline, which required an 8:1 slope to clear. Additionally, there is a 13-foot-high berm with a road 145 feet from the threshold and more trees some 93 feet from the runway. The Cardinal came down short of the runway, nose first into a ravine. There was no fire, but fuel spilled when the wing tanks were compromised. According to witnesses, both men survived the crash but expired a short time later. The NTSB is still investigating the accident.

Like so many, I was stunned and rattled by the accident—so much so that I spent the better part of two hours recreating the event in the Redbird configured like the Cardinal, practicing the improbable turn. If it could happen to Spad, it could happen to me, I thought. A few times, I ended up in the ravine.  Later I spent two hours flying a Cessna 172 with the most experienced instructor I know in the Seattle area. It felt good to get some dual again.

Death by Time Builder

In October, I wrote Death By Time Builder in response to a crash in Kentucky involving an instructor, Timothy McKellar Jr., 22, who did a night cross-country flight in convective weather with l8-year-old private pilot candidate Connor Quisenberry. They were killed when thunderstorms tore the Piper Warrior apart. It is a sad story, made infuriating because McKellar, who had a pronounced social media presence, documented his frustration with the learner–and the approaching thunderstorms via Snapchat during the flight when, as an instructor, he should have been focused on teaching.

According to social media posts, McKellar soloed at Eagle Flight Academy in Owensboro, Kentucky, in 2020 but did the bulk of his training at ATP. He earned his private pilot certificate in spring of 2022, followed by instrument rating and commercial certificates, and in April 2023, his CFI rating. On his social media accounts, he listed ATP as his employer, but the fatal flight originated from Eagle Flight Academy. 

Based on the track recorded by FlightAware, which shows multiple laps in the pattern at Bowling Green, it appears the flight was done to satisfy the three hours of night flying and ten takeoffs and landings required for private pilot certification.

McKellar’s snaps included disparaging observations about Quisenberry’s intellect made during the flight. That is never okay. The CFI needs to be focused on teaching in the cockpit. Put the damn phone down.

The final Snapchat was made on the return leg and shows a preview of the flight path from Bowling Green to Owensboro overlying a radar image showing severe storms heading toward them. McKellar compares them to ‘pissed off hornets,’ noting that they are heading toward them, yet the flight continues with thunderstorms on either side of the proposed track. 

Flying into thunderstorms or trying to outrun them or duck between them screams ‘get there itis,’ and hazardous attitudes invulnerability, macho, anti-authority, impulsivity, and you might say resignation as when working with primary students the instructor is the pilot in command and responsible for the safety of the flight. The fact McKellar allowed the flight to happen at all with convective activity in the forecast is perplexing. 

In the last contact with ATC, McKellar asks for an IFR clearance, reporting the aircraft was being blown around like crazy. ATC gives a heading to turn to. The radar track from FlightAware shows the aircraft passing through the assigned heading, and there was no further communication. The wreckage was found spread over a 25 acre area.

Aeronautical decision making is a big part of learning to fly, and the ability to make good decisions can be compromised when the CFI is more focused on ‘getting it done’ and or social media presence. One wonders if McKellar had good risk management modeled for him as a learner. 

A few weeks after the event I attended the National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI) summit and this event was a topic of discussion. A great many professional CFIs and Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) are concerned about the time builders who rush through training and don’t have the time to mature as educators. Should we trust them to train the next generation of pilots?

When training  centers on passing the check rides and becoming an instructor to build hours, the focus often isn’t on becoming a good teacher, as it is seen as a stepping stone. It’s the learners who pay for this when their CFI demonstrates poor risk management, such as flying into a thunderstorm at night. I submit Quisenberry would have learned much more about decision making had McKellar canceled the flight. And both families would likely still have their sons.

Business Stories

On the business side of aviation, the announcement this month that Alaska Airlines was buying struggling rival Hawaiian Airlines for $1.9 billion got mixed reviews from my airport sons and daughters who fly for both carriers. The acquisition was several months in the making and included Alaska Airlines taking $900 million in Hawaiian Airlines debt. While it may keep the island-based carrier afloat, it is not clear what impact this will have on seniority numbers. It’s just nice to know Hawaiian Airlines won’t disappear.

The Fun Stories

In early July, we asked our readers to help track down the legacy of Captain Jack L. Martin, a World War II-era aviator who went on to help establish the Flying Tiger Line, one of the first cargo airlines in the United States. Captain Martin went west in 1970, so he never met Anne Palmer Martin, who married his son Bob decades later. Palmer Martin was a college classmate of mine, and I was positively over the moon when she offered me the A-2 flight jacket that belonged to Captain Martin after Bob, who had inherited his father’s jacket, went west. It had been in the closet for years, and she hoped I could help her learn more about the jacket and the man who wore it, as I am a collector. Challenge accepted.

The jacket, dry and brittle with age, was carefully restored and photographed, and I reached out to my warbird and vintage jacket aficionados. There was one photograph of a 20-something Captain Martin wearing the jacket and what appears to be a USAAF uniform standing next to another man in uniform at what appears to be an air base. There are T-6s in the background and one of our readers told us the airplane they are leaning on appears to be a Beechcraft AT-11, which was a bombardier trainer during WWII.

We heard from several readers who knew Captain Martin from his civilian flying career. He flew supply missions to the Defense Early Warning line as it was being built during the Cold War and flew over both poles. He was well-liked and a good teacher, they said, and shared a few images of Captain Martin in uniform—including one that also showed Bob as a little boy with his father and sister.

Stuffy the Kitten Makes it Home

The most fun story came out of AirVenture 2023, and really didn’t have much to do with aviation, but rather the way the aviation community pulls together to help each other—that is the story of Stuffy the toy kitty that was accidentally left behind at KidVenture on July 24. Stuffy belongs to 6-year-old Brayden Eveleth of Grandview, Iowa. Eveleth celebrated his birthday at AirVenture, and one of his gifts was the plush toy cat that when microwaved, gives off a lavender scent. According to his mother, Ashley Eveleth, the whole family was distraught when Stuffy went missing while Brayden was distracted by the activities at KidVenture. The family retraced their steps and contacted EAA lost and found looking for the misplaced toy. As luck would have it, EAA volunteer Gary Sternberg posted a photograph of the found plushy cat on Facebook on July 28, urging readers to help the toy get back to its owner. Sternberg told FLYING he understands how important childhood attachment objects are to their owners, so he takes a vested interest in their return.

Real talk: having had a similar experience as a child when Reckless, the orange plush cat that was my copilot on my B-25/fort in the backyard was stolen, I was all over this one. The FLYING story went up on social media, and both it and Sternberg’s post were copied and shared several times over. We were able to track down the Eveleth family, who were overjoyed to hear the toy had been found.

The kind folks at EAA shipped Stuffy home, and Ashley Eveleth shared a video with FLYING of Brayden opening the box in the back of his mother’s car and weeping with joy to see his kitty again.

The post Stories That Struck a Chord This Year appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

But countering the success of the company’s designs and their unprecedented popularity were challenges compounded by the COVID pandemic, a failure by a key supplier and missteps of its own. Monday’s Chapter 11 filing gives some clues to the situation Van’s faces that pushed the company into a form of bankruptcy that most often precedes a reorganization and recovery. (Van’s is not liquidating. Chapter 11 is designed to give a company some relief from liabilities and enable a reorganization into a sustainable business.)

In the Chapter 11 declaration is this summary: “Until recently Van’s operated successfully without bank loans or other lines of credit, relying on customer deposits and earnings for its working capital.” But then Van’s faced “a combination of unforeseen, significant events occurring over a relatively short period of time increased Debtor’s [Van’s Aircraft’s] costs, doubled its normal inventory levels, slowed deliveries, and strained Debtor’s cash flow to the breaking point.” Support from founder Dick VanGrunsven since September has kept the company afloat.

• READ MORE: Van’s Aircraft Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection

One could argue that Van’s trouble started with an issue regarding quickbuild kits. The offshore constructor failed to adequately corrosion-proof parts of the assembly, which led Van’s to a time-consuming side project to understand the nature of the problem and its scope, and construct a remedy. The issue is described in the declaration as a “multi-million-dollar setback” for Van’s. Moreover, it contributed to a growing backlog in ordered kits and extended delivery times for customers.

At the same time, there was unprecedented demand for kits during the early stages of COVID. (In fact, the entire homebuilt industry witnessed a surge in popularity, with all major kit manufacturers reporting greatly increased sales in 2020 and 2021.) For Van’s, kit sales rose from 1594 during 2019 (already a very good number for the company) to 2508 in 2020 and 3982 in 2021. According to the filing, revenue actually decreased from $31.5 million in 2019 to $31.1 million in 2020, despite a 1000-unit increase in orders. Van’s didn’t get the bulk of the kit payment until shipment. In 2021, however, the big increases in order began to show up in revenue, increasing to $37.6 million in 2021 and $52.6 million in 2022. Net income, as described in the declaration, was $2.6 million in 2019, $3 million in 2020, but dropped to $2.1 million in 2021 as investments to increase capacity began to appear in the financials. In 2022, Van’s net income turned red, with a loss of $3.3 million; it lost $1 million through the end of August this year against revenues of $43 million.

It’s important to understand that Van’s was already operating at or near capacity in 2019. Along with technical changes to the kits over time that placed more work at the factory (steps the builder would not have to perform, an expectation in the modern kit-aircraft world), Van’s found itself with greatly increased demand and set about finding ways to meet it.

Because the vast majority of the company’s kit parts are known as “pre-punched” parts and the machines that do the punching formed the production roadblock, Van’s looked for ways to increase capacity by outsourcing some of this step. One way was to have the parts normally punched instead have their holes cut by a laser. This is a common method for automating manufacture of sheet metal parts, along with CNC routers, punches and water-jet cutting. In fact, Van’s had been using laser cutting for some parts and then elected to laser-cut more of them.

Builders began to notice that some laser-cut parts would crack during the dimpling process—where the metal is formed for the purpose of installing flush rivets—and that eventually started Van’s engineering department down the path of discovering why this was happening. Many builders felt that Van’s was slow to acknowledge the problem and that by the time it did, there was a significant quantity of laser-cut parts out in the world. Van’s turned its full attention to the problem and identified the parts in question—more recently, they were able to far more accurately predict which specific airplane kits were likely to have the suspect parts. Latest estimates are that some 1800 kits are affected.

These issues would challenge many companies but they were compounded by other events, as the declaration shows. “Van’s order file doubled in the 2020 and 2021 period. At the same time, supply chain issues, and supplier shutdowns slowed productions of key components, increasing back orders and delaying order completions, requiring Debtor to hire and train more staff. Wages increased, and shipping costs rose more than four-fold during this period. Stated simply, without realizing it, Debtor was selling a high volume of aircraft kits below its cost. The combination of all these factors overstressed Van’s workforce, operating support systems and management skills resulting in a series of one-off but very costly errors.” The declaration also notes that, “Some of its senior employees with deep familiarity with both office and manufacturing process workings chose to retire during COVID.”

The picture painted is of a company overwhelmed by overlapping challenges, started by the primer issue with quickbuild kits and followed closely by a global pandemic that simultaneously cut into its manufacturing capacity, dramatically increased costs and, perhaps ironically, also greatly boosted demand. That in the effort to catch up with demand the company also lost track of internal costs and failed to increase kit prices (as one remedy) is one inescapable takeaway from the factual descriptions in the Chapter 11 declaration—and a good indication of the remedies needed to define its path forward.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on KITPLANES.

The post Van’s Bankruptcy: How Did It Get Here? appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Time builders are the flight instructors who, although they hold an instructor certificate, are focused on building their hours, not teaching. They may not know how to teach beyond the test because that’s how they were trained. This is particularly common if they went through an accelerated program where the focus is get ’em, get ’em out.

Rote learning, as opposed to understanding, application, and the level where we seek correlation often doesn’t happen. Correlation requires the learner to perform real-world tasks and exhibit in-depth knowledge by problem-solving rather than responding by rote.

It is coming back to bite us. The number of time builders teaching to the rote level is manifesting at the private pilot level as the failure rate for private pilot applicants on the check ride, which is higher than 50 percent in some places. They are being pushed through the pipeline just as many of their instructors were. The experience boxes have been checked and endorsements given, but even if the applicant passes the check ride, that doesn’t mean they are ready for the real world. This is particularly true of instructor applicants.

Currently, the instructor community at large is talking about a particular crash—I cannot in good conscience call this one an accident—that happened in Kentucky last week involving a time builder instructor with an affinity for social media and an 18-year-old private pilot candidate. I can’t call it an accident because there were so many blatant mistakes and failures to identify and address. I have been a CFI for 20 years, and I have never seen one like this before.

Details

On September 27, the Piper Warrior belonging to Eagle Flight Academy in Owensboro, Kentucky, was supposed to make a night flight from Owensboro/Daviess County Regional Airport (KOWB) to Bowling Green-Warren County Regional Airport (KBWG) in Kentucky.

Aboard were Connor Quisenberry, a private pilot candidate, and flight instructor Timothy McKellar Jr., 22.

The events of the evening were documented by McKellar on Snapchat. That’s right. The flight instructor decided to document the flight. It is clear that Quisenberry is not a regular student of McKellar’s, because McKellar’s Snapchat story begins with him talking to the camera and shaking his head along with the caption, “me and this student should not get along if he was my full-time student. I’ve seen faster at the Special Olympics.”

If that blatant smear isn’t enough to turn the viewer away, it gets worse. The camera angle is then reversed to show Quisenberry, flashlight in hand, performing what appears to be the preflight inspection of the Warrior. McKellar impatiently taps his fingers on the outside of the aircraft.

McKellar expresses impatience with Quisenberry who “wanted to have a conversation” when the instructor wants to get the flight over with because he has to be up at 4:30 a.m. McKellar refers to Quisenberry as “Forrest Gump.” The time stamp of the Snapchat shows 8:39 p.m. as McKellar is heard saying, “C’mon.” He posts that the pair have a three-hour flight ahead. The video continues showing the night takeoff and in-flight cruise.

McKellar makes a second reference to Quisenberry as Forrest Gump, stating that he is “just giving it to him straight up,” to which Quisenberry allegedly replies to the criticism by saying, “I don’t mind you being hard on me. I know I need it.”

The final Snapchat posted by McKellar shows a preview of the flight path from Bowling Green to Owensboro over top radar showing severe storms heading toward them.

McKellar circles the storms and writes, “headed are [sic] way like a group of pissed off hornets.”

It has not escaped the instructor community that McKellar, who was critical of the intellectual capacity of Quisenberry, uses “are” instead of “our” in his post. And continued the flight into a thunderstorm.

The TAFs and METARs from the area at the time of the flight showed severe weather in all quadrants. The question is asked:  Given this information as noted by Snapchat, why did the flight continue?

The Last Moments

You cannot visually see thunderclouds at night, but apparently the flight continued into them as FlightAware shows the aircraft made some extreme altitude fluctuations, and McKellar asked for an IFR clearance and was told to head east before contact was lost.

According to local law enforcement, the wreckage was found spread out over three-quarters of a mile in mountainous terrain. The National Transportation Safety Board is expected to release a preliminary report on the accident in a few weeks.

Aftermath

McKellar’s behavior will likely be used as a case study for future flight instructor candidates. Frustration on the part of both the instructor and learner is a normal part of the flight training process, and both must learn to deal with it.

The flight instructor is supposed to be able to compartmentalize it, or at the very least restrain themself from publicly shaming their learner on social media. It goes the other way too. Learners who do this to their instructors will likely find themselves ostracized from the flight school. Remember the phrase “praise in public, criticize in private”—and make that criticism constructive.

McKellar’s friends and family have defended him on social media, insisting “Junior was a jokester and just messing with his student” and suggesting people view McKellar’s YouTube channel.

There is a lot of aviation there, including a video where McKellar appears to sip 100LL from a sump cup then jokes how he will smell like fuel for the rest of the day.

McKellar was a relatively inexperienced instructor. His social media shows he soloed in October 2020 at a small flight school then did the bulk of his training at ATP Flight School, the largest accelerated training program in the U.S. He earned his commercial and flight instructor certificates in May 2023. It is not clear how many hours of dual instruction he had accrued before the last flight.

Had McKellar not chosen to Snapchat the ill-fated flight, this might have been viewed as just a bad accident. Rule No. 1 is keep the learner safe, noting the pilot in command (PIC)—in this case, the CFI—is responsible for the safety of the flight. McKellar was PIC, and he failed miserably at this task.

Is This One Age Related?

It has been suggested that age is a factor in this event. How mature were you at 22? Were you starting a business? Going to school? Still living off Mom and Dad? Starting a career? Trying to find a career? Maturity at any age runs the gamut. 

While there is a numeric quality to maturity, it very much depends on the person. There is no maturity test for flight instructors, which is unfortunate since, although it is an entry level position to a flying career, the stakes are quite high.

There are 18- to 20-somethings who work as CFIs as a means of building their hours and are good teachers. They listen to their learners and seek the counsel of more experienced instructors when they run into a challenge. They may even sit in on the ground schools taught by more experienced instructors because they want to improve their skills. They understand that telling a learner about something or demonstrating it in the aircraft doesn’t necessarily mean learning has taken place.

Much of this comes down to communication skills. As far as McKellar’s “giving it to [sic] the learner straight up,” direct communication can be accomplished without being insulting. When providing guidance to the learner, refer to the airman certification standards for the metrics they are measured to. “Your altitude sucks” or “you’re so rusty, we need a jack hammer” are neither professional nor helpful communication. All the learner may take from this is that they don’t want to fly with you again.

It is heartbreaking that Quisenberry allegedly accepted McKellar’s behavior as the norm. Connor, I know you can’t hear me when I say this, but I speak to all the other Connors out there: I am sorry this happened to you. Albeit, the concept of an instructor being hard on a learner can be a matter of perspective. If an instructor says your skills need some work, they don’t say it to be mean. The professional CFIs will pull out the ACS to show you where the soft spots in your skills are. Then they will help you shore them up. No CFI wants you to bend metal, get hurt or fail a check ride.

There is a big difference between “being hard” on a learner by holding you to the standards set forth in the ACS and being insulting or verbally abusive. If you had a little more life experience under your belt, you might have walked away from this CFI. And no one would have blamed you.

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That truism holds whether you’re approaching the grand event at Aéroport Paris-Le Bourget in France as a spectator, a member of the trade, or an exhibitor proposing a new product, service, or technology for the future.

For us, we took the metro, then the train, then walked the 2 miles to the entrance gate, 1 hour, 15 minutes each way. There were buses—but we walked faster than they could move through the traffic. For those who had houses rented nearby, the time en route fluctuated horribly—and was no better, stuck in the congestion. I honestly considered electric vertical takeoff and landing craft in a different light—but could we all be buzzing around? Would it just transfer the congestion from the streets to the skies?

But for those exhibiting, the road to #PAS2023 clearly began years—even a decade or more—ago, as the maturity of solutions like those very eVTOLs shone brightly as a force field against the pressures to decarbonize. And they joined sustainable aviation fuel, hydrogen-powered aircraft, and new ways to make lift in concert to assuage the skepticism that we could collectively achieve the net-zero emission goals the industry has promised by 2050.

So, How Did it Feel?

Normally rotating years with the similar aerospace trade show of record in Farnborough, UK, “Le Bourget” last commenced in July 2019, a victim in 2021 of the extended seizures of the pandemic. 

I’ve spent the bulk of my career in general aviation—with a short foray at a Boeing subsidiary, but still in aviation training—so the while Paris the city wasn’t new to me, the Paris Air Show was. So, in late June, we formed a vacation around PAS, to visit friends in Paris and see for myself what the spectacle would hold. 

How would it feel to walk around a static display not just hosting the latest from Gulfstream and Dassault and Daher, but also Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer’s commercial transport category jets and bristling military hardware? As it turns out, imposing to stand next to, but also thrilling. And I once again had that feeling I’d been a fighter pilot in another life when I sat in the Super Tocano at Embraer. No, they didn’t allow selfies…

Dassault celebrated its 60th anniversary with Mirage and Rafale displays across the aisle from its trijet Falcon 8X, 2000LXS, the nearly-certificated 6X and the 10X mockup. We watched the airshow for a bit after lunch with former Dassault test pilots from the deck of the media chalet—a completely different airshow performance than the ones I know so well from EAA AirVenture and Sun ’n Fun and the Reno Air Races.

In fact, I had a chance to sit in on one of the pilot briefings for the airshow on Thursday morning and climbed the stairs in the rain to the control-tower-like command center from which the air boss and his deputies would coordinate the whole affair. A common thread? After briefing the weather, boxes, and run of show, everyone save the pilots were dismissed for the debrief on the previous days’ events. The debrief stays sacred and reserved to just those flying—to preserve its integrity and allow for the free flow of information and safety recommendations. More on that in a follow on story for FLYING.

But Wait, What About the Big Guys?

We took a brief tour of the Boeing 777X-9, all kitted out inside for flight test—just like the flight test articles of the much smaller jets. I think of being on board the Cessna Citation Mustang conforming prototype in 2006. So the 777X is just… a lot bigger. 

While on board, we talked with Brad Surak, who heads up Boeing Digital Services now, with Jeppesen, ForeFlight, and now Cloud Ahoy under his oversight—probably one of the few GA spaces left within the Big B. The good news? It sure sounds like they are allowing the teams they’ve acquired to keep focused in their respective lanes. More on that, too, in a later story.

Technology on Display

And what of the halls filled with delegations from countries around the globe, presenting their research, and workforce, and production skill sets as solutions? Mockups, prototypes in various states of compliance, and an endless stream full of great ideas.

My personal favorite—and yes, the subject of upcoming coverage in the magazine—was the EcoPulse technology demonstrator, which is a joint project between Daher, Safran, and Airbus. It appeals to me not only because of its TBM DNA, but because it is so completely and purposefully not-even-close to a commercial product. And it was on display in its full reveal. 

We know that aerospace manufacturers experiment all the time to drive forward—and as aviation journalists we relish the chase, trying to figure out what the next move will be from a favorite OEM. There are so many questions to answer—and it was with clear delight that the program’s manager for Daher, Christophe Robin, walked us around F-WECO, essentially telling us everything that was working as well as a bunch of things that never would. And they were so glad to find out. Though I’m sure there’s more they’re not quite ready to share yet…

Another great example of future-forward application of new sources of power for flight? The Elfly project underway in Norway. Taking a tried and true airframe style based somewhat on the amphibious Grumman Albatross, the Noemi (for “no emissions”) plans to utilize quiet electric motors to access a string of seaplane ports along Norway’s fjordic coast. They hope to be operational commercially in 2029.

And the Elephant in the Room?

So, you may be asking, did we see protests like the ones popping up across France—and throughout Europe—all summer, spiteful towards private aviation? 

Security was like an unseen hand, most of the time, and it wrapped itself around Le Bourget as though wearing a velvet glove. We passed a few minutes every morning in the media entrance line having bags and bodies searched, as you might expect—and the maze to get in the general entrance gate was really interesting—made purposefully difficult to run straight through.

But we spent more than an hour each day walking from the train station to the airport gates, with no signs of strife. There were, however, more police vans assembled along the perimeter roads than I have seen in after several years of living in the western EU. Most of the gendarmerie appeared to be playing Sudoku on their phones.

And within Paris itself, we were fortunate too—aside from getting a dose of eau de Metro during rush hour a few times, we escaped unscathed and fully provisioned with wine, paté, and great stories for the months ahead to pursue.

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