According to officials, the aircraft went down around 12:15 p.m. CDT in a farm field near Wittman Regional Airport (KOSH). 

“This area is about 2 miles south of the EAA AirVenture event and was first reported by ATC in the Wittman Airport tower,” Winnebago County Sheriff’s Office said in a statement. “Upon arrival, responders discovered that the plane was fully engulfed in fire. At this time, we can confirm that there were two occupants in the plane, and that they are both deceased.”

The black smoke was visible from the airport at the annual weeklong airshow, which opened Monday and attracts thousands of visitors from all over the world, according to media reports.

The names of the people on board the aircraft have not been released.

This is a developing story.

The post 2 Killed in Plane Crash Near EAA AirVenture appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The first crash happened on June 15 in Chino, California, when Lockheed N93R was taking part in a Father’s Day airshow. The pilot and copilot were killed when the aircraft crashed during takeoff. The pilot took off with the flaps fully extended. 

Lockheed N93R

The NTSB noted that video of the takeoff shows the flaps down and the aircraft struggling to climb. The vintage twin reached an altitude of approximately 300 feet before plunging to the left. There was a post-impact fire.

The crew had lowered the flaps as part of the preflight inspection but did not retract them before takeoff. The NTSB noted that during engine start the ground crew used arm and hand signals to try to let the pilot and copilot know the flaps were in the fully extended position.

Lockheed N2072

The second accident occurred on June 18 at Seven Lakes Airport (62GA) in Jackson, Georgia. The pilot, the commercially rated copilot, and a passenger were seriously injured when the privately owned 1936 Lockheed 12A Electra Junior (N2072) veered off the turf runway during landing.

Video of the landing taken by a bystander on the ground shows the aircraft on approach to the turf runway with the flaps and gear down. The touchdown appears normal, then as the aircraft slows and the tailwheel settles to the ground, the aircraft veers to the left. The videographer lowers the camera so the aircraft’s impact with a tree is heard but not shown.

• READ MORE: 3 Left Injured in Georgia Lockheed 12A Crash

“The impact crushed the cockpit] aft toward the cabin,” the NTSB report said. “A tree trunk about 2 feet in circumference was observed within the cockpit. The instrument panel was buckled around the tree trunk. The pilot, co-pilot, and passenger seats were crushed up and aft.”

The investigation quickly focused on the brakes and the tailwheel as both are used for directional control on the ground. Examination of the main landing gear braking system revealed hydraulic fluid on the landing gear strut and hydraulic fluid leaking from the brake line fitting.

“The steel-braided brake line B-nut fitting, which connected the right brake caliper to the rigid brake line attached to the right landing gear strut, was finger-tight, and hydraulic fluid was observed leaking from the fitting,” the NTSB said.

The fitting on the left brake could not be moved by hand and there was no fluid leakage.

Investigators stated the tailwheel lock control lever was found in the locked position, but the locking tab on the control-wheel assembly appeared to be unlocked.

The NTSB final report on both accidents is likely several months out as it can take 18 to 24 months for investigations to be completed.

The post NTSB Releases Details on 2 Lockheed 12A Crashes appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The aircraft were flying in the pattern of the Fun Fly Zone (FFZ), which is located in the Ultralight area.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the accident occurred when the gyroplane pilot violated established and briefed FFZ procedures by making a prohibited 360-degree turn in the pattern before colliding  with the helicopter.

• NTSB: Rule Violation Contributed to Fatal Midair Collision at EAA AirVenture

The pilot and passenger of the helicopter were killed and the pilot and passenger of the gyrocopter were seriously injured. No one on the ground was injured, however, an unoccupied aircraft was destroyed when the gyroplane came down on top of it.

According to the NTSB final report (below) on the accident, in addition to the one-strike rule, the EAA has adopted the following changes to prevent future mishaps:

• Standardized briefing for all types of FFZ operations
• Standardized traffic pattern for all types of FFZ operations with exception of the powered-parachutes group due to speed performance
• Standardized aircraft spotter locations for all types of FFZ operations
• Designated sterile corridor for traffic on base leg over the north/south paved road

The NTSB’s final report is below.

The post EAA Adopts New Procedures in Wake of AirVenture NTSB Crash Report appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

I looked off the extended centerline hoping to see the landing light of the twin. No joy. The skies were hazy due to forest fire smoke, and the light was flat because it was late afternoon and, frankly, it was difficult to see anything.

The C-172 pilot reduced engine power and configured the aircraft for a descent. Normal procedures called for losing 200 to 300 feet of altitude then turning base when the runway was at a 45-degree angle to the aircraft.

“Do you see the twin?” I asked, because I still didn’t have a visual. 

“Nope,” the pilot said, stopping the descent. “I’m not turning base until I see him. I’m not going to do a Watsonville.”  

• READ MORE: Avoiding Mid-Airs: Safety in the Practice Area

We continued on an extended downwind for another 10 seconds, then the pilot of the C-172 decided to break off the approach and depart to the west. He told me he planned to reenter on the 45. As he rolled wings level to the west, we finally saw the twin—on short final. 

Watsonville

“Watsonville” refers to an August 2022 midair collision between a Cessna 152 and a Cessna 340A at Watsonville Municipal Airport (KWVI) in California. Three people and a dog were killed.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released the final report on the accident earlier this year. All accident reports present an opportunity to learn. What I learned from this one is that in aviation you can be doing everything right, but if someone else does something wrong, you can still get hurt. 

Deconstructing Watsonville

According to the NTSB, on August 18, 2022, around 3 p.m. PDT the pilot of the C-152 was in the pattern for Runway 20 as the pilot of the C-340A was attempting a straight in. It was a VFR day. Both pilots were communicating on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).

The pilot of the C-152 was flying in the traffic pattern of the nontowered airport and making position reports on the airport’s CTAF. The pilot of the twin made an initial radio call 10 miles from the airport announcing his intentions to perform a straight approach for Runway 20. The pilot of the C-152 was flying the pattern for Runway 20. He made position reports as he turned on each leg of the pattern—as a well-trained pilot does. 

I listened to the  recordings of the CTAF on LiveATC.com after the event. The C-152 pilot’s radio calls were concise and informative.

Just after the pilot of the twin reported a 3-mile final, the pilot of the C-152 announced he was turning left base for Runway 20. Around 19 seconds later, the twin pilot reported that he was a mile from the airport. The last transmission of the C-152 pilot noted how quickly the larger airplane was coming up behind him and announced he was going around. 

The Cessna twin hit the C-152 from behind. The aircraft collided less than a mile from the runway at an altitude of approximately 150 feet above ground. There were several witnesses on the ground, and the collision was caught on security cameras near the airport.

The Aftermath

Investigators using ADS-B data determined the twin was at a ground speed of 180 knots, more than twice that of the C-152 on approach and considerably faster than the normal C-340A approach speed of 120 knots. 

The examination of the wreckage revealed the twin’s wing flaps and landing gear were both retracted at the time of the collision, which is consistent with the pilot’s failure to configure the airplane for landing. Normal flap extension speed for the C-340A is 160 knots, and the landing gear extension is 140 knots. Investigators noted that the faster speed reduced the pilot’s time to see the smaller aircraft. 

Witnesses on the ground reported the twin veered to the right at the last second, but it wasn’t enough to avoid the smaller, slower aircraft.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be “the failure of the pilot of the multiengine airplane to see and avoid the single-engine airplane while performing a straight-in approach for landing.”

Applying Lessons at Home

That Watsonville accident was talked about for weeks at my home airport as there are a few light twins based there. These airplanes often do straight-in approaches, or fly the RNAV 35 in VFR conditions. It is legal for them to do so. 

One of the lessons I impart is for the learners to pay attention to the make of aircraft as well as their distance from the runway during position reports. “Cessna twin” tells me that it is faster and larger than the Cessna 100 series aircraft I normally fly. Conversely, if I hear “yellow Cub,” I know to keep looking for slower traffic.

Right of Way

Clearing the area before you turn is one of the first lessons a pilot learns. It is the aviation version of look before you cross the street.

One of my best learners, an Army helicopter pilot going for her fixed wing add-on, had this down cold. She was used to flying in a multicrewed environment so she would say, “Look left, clearing left, coming left,” then make the turn. If there was another aircraft, she’d announce, “Not clear to the left, not sure if he sees me,” then she would turn to avoid the other aircraft, often taking us in the opposite direction or changing altitude. This was even if we technically had the right of way, per FAR 91.113.

FAR 91.113 states: “When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.” It is difficult to avoid the other aircraft if you don’t see them—and don’t count on ADS-B as a crutch, as some aircraft are not equipped with it. You still need to keep your eyes outside.

The details of FAR 91.113 state which aircraft have right-of-way over others. Basically, the least maneuverable, such as a glider (no engine for go-around) or airship (those things are slow), have the right of way over an airplane, unless the airplane is being towed, refueled, or is in distress. 

FAR 91.113 also states that the aircraft being overtaken has the right of way—as the C-152 did in Watsonville. But the rules don’t help if the pilot of the other aircraft doesn’t see you. 

Instead of potentially putting yourself in front of a faster, larger aircraft, take precautionary evasive action, even if you do technically have the right of way. There are a lot of rights worth dying for. Right of way is not one of them.

The post Remembering Right of Way and Steering Clear of a ‘Watsonville’ appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

New details reveal the incident occurred during a skydiving operation at Raeford West Airport (NR20) in North Carolina. The pilots were on approach to pick up another group of skydivers with second in command (SIC) Crooks flying. According to the NTSB report, the approach was stable until the aircraft descended below the tree line and encountered wind shear. Crooks initiated a go-around, but before establishing a climb, the right main landing gear struck the runway surface and then detached.

The pilots then declared an emergency and requested to divert to a larger airport. The pilot in command (PIC) took over while Crooks communicated with ATC. According to the unnamed PIC, Crooks became visibly upset following the hard landing. He proceeded to open his side cockpit window and lower the ramp in the back of the aircraft, indicating he needed air. Crooks then apologized, left his seat, removed his headset, and ran out of the airplane via the aft ramp door.

• READ MORE: NTSB Preliminary Report Sheds Light on Copilot Mid-Air Departure

According to the report, “although the PIC and operator reported that the SIC’s departure from the airplane was an intentional act, there was insufficient information to support that assertion.”

Federal investigators also noted that the PIC, who was flying with Crooks, served as the chief pilot for the operator, which could have contributed to his stress. Family members told investigators Crooks was “extremely happy” and “loved to fly,” noting that he was in “a fabulous state of mind” prior to the flight.

• READ MORE: Copilot’s Departure of Aircraft in Mid-Flight Baffles Authorities

Ultimately, investigators listed the probable cause as “the airplane’s encounter with wind shear during landing, which resulted in a hard landing and separation of the right main landing gear, and the pilot’s subsequent decision to leave his seat in flight, which resulted in his fall from the airplane.”

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post NTSB’s Final Report Leaves Unanswered Questions in Copilot’s Fatal Fall appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Anders, 90, was a retired military pilot and Air Force major general, Apollo-era NASA astronaut, and founder of the Heritage Flight Museum.

According to the preliminary investigation published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a friend told investigators that Anders sent her a text message before the June 7 morning flight stating he would be flying past her house at 11:40 a.m., which was close to his old residence located on the western shore of Orcas Island.

• READ MORE: Apollo Astronaut William Anders, 90, Dies in T-34 Crash

The witness said these flights were not unusual, although the accident flight was the first time he had performed it in 2024. The witness said that Anders would sometimes rock the wings of the airplane but did not perform aerobatic maneuvers.

Radar data provided by the FAA showed a target departing Skagit Bayview Regional Airport (KBVS) at about 11:13 the morning of the accident but did not include altitude data.

The target flew west toward Orcas Island and performed a series of passes back and forth along the coastline of the San Juan Channel.

The graphics provided by the NTSB report show the aircraft flying a route back and forth along the shoreline.

The friend told investigators that she heard the airplane, then a short time later she observed it overhead traveling north along the shoreline in front of her house. The aircraft then flew behind trees and out of view, and she could hear but not see what sounded like the airplane making a left turn to the south. The airplane came back into view, rolling out on a south heading.

“It was flying over the water but higher than the previous occasions,” the witness told NTSB investigators.

After the aircraft passed, the witness saw the left wing drop, and she thought this was part

of his usual routine. However, the wing continued to drop as the airplane began to rapidly descend toward the water.

• READ MORE: 55 Years Ago, Apollo 8 Astronauts Deliver Christmas Eve Message of Unity

Another witness located along the same shoreline about a third of a mile to the north said he observed the aircraft from his deck. He began to record the aircraft with his phone.

“At the beginning of the recording the airplane was inverted with a slight nose down attitude and heading generally to the south,” the NTSB report said. “Over the next three seconds, the airplane had transitioned to an almost vertical dive. As the airplane approached the water, it began to pull out of the dive, now facing the opposite direction. By the time it had recovered to almost wings level, upright attitude, the airplane struck the water with its right wing tip and spun across the water on a northern trajectory.”

Video of the event shows the aircraft being torn apart by the impact.

The NTSB said that these were the only witnesses to come forward with information. The final report on the accident is still months away.

The post NTSB: Witness Provides Details Leading Up to Fatal T-34 Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

It was about 1 o’clock in the morning. The air on the surface was warm and humid. If he checked the weather—there was no evidence that he did—he would have expected to find widespread but patchy cloudiness over the route of flight and at the destination. In some places clouds were broken or scattered with tops at 3,000. Elsewhere buildups climbed into the flight levels. Ceilings and visibilities under the clouds were good, at worst 700 feet and 5 miles. The temperature and the dew point were only 3 degrees apart, however, and there was a slightly increased risk of fog formation owing to, of all things, particulate pollution from dust blown in from the Sahara.

During the short flight, he climbed to 3,600 feet, probably to get above some cloud tops. It was pitch-dark as the crescent moon was far below the horizon. As he neared his destination he descended to 1,500 msl, 1,300 feet above the terrain, and reduced his groundspeed from 175 knots to 100 knots.

The airstrip at which he intended to land was 3,500 feet long, 40 feet wide, and had a light gray concrete surface oriented 4/22. Other than a hangar on an apron at midfield, there were no structures on the airport and no edge lights along the runway.

The only lights were red ones marking the runway ends. The surrounding area was largely dark. Sam Rayburn Reservoir sat close by to the north and east, a vast region of uninterrupted black. Parallel to the runway, about half a mile north, was State Highway 147, lighted only by the headlamps of infrequently passing cars.

• READ MORE: Two Fatal Cases of the Simply Inexperienced

For almost an hour, the pilot flew back and forth over the airstrip, tracing a tangled path of seemingly random right and left turns. His altitude varied between 350 and 1,100 feet agl and his groundspeed between 65 and 143 knots. His ground track, as recorded by ATC radar, suggested no systematic plan, but it was broadly centered on the northeast end of the runway.

The last return from the Saratoga, recorded 54 minutes after it arrived over the field, put it 9,700 feet from the northeast end of the runway on a close-in extended left downwind leg for Runway 22 at a height of 350 feet agl and a groundspeed of 94 knots. The Saratoga was below radar for the remainder of the flight.

Its burned wreckage was found at the southern edge of the clear-cut area surrounding the runway, several hundred feet short of the threshold. A trail of parts led back across the clear-cut to its north side, where the airplane had clipped a treetop at the edge of the woods. From the orientation of the wreckage path, it appeared that the Saratoga may have overshot the centerline on base and was correcting back toward the approach end lights when it struck the tree.

In the course of the accident investigation, it emerged that the airplane was out of annual, its last inspection having occurred in 2017, the registration had expired, and the pilot’s medical was out of date. The pilot had 400 hours (estimated) but did not have an instrument rating and, in fact, had only a student certificate. The autopsy turned up residues of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC (the psychoactive component of cannabis), but investigators did not rule out the possibility that the drugs could have had a therapeutic purpose.

• READ MORE: Three-Mile Limit: Novice Pilots Succumb to the Perils of Total Darkness

The National Transportation Safety Board’s report on the accident declines to speculate on whether the drugs impaired the pilot in any way. In fact, the NTSB report concedes that “the pilot’s aircraft handling was not deficient relative to his limited experience of flying in night instrument conditions and the prolonged period of approach attempts.” The finding of probable cause cited only the pilot’s “poor decision-making as he attempted to land at an unlit airstrip in night instrument conditions.”

The pilot bought the Saratoga in 2016 and then took flying lessons, but he stopped short of getting the private certificate. His instructor said he had never given him any instrument training. The pilot’s wife said that he “normally” flew to the airport at night and circled down until he could see the runway.

The airport was in Class G airspace. What the cloud conditions were we don’t know—the nearest automated reporting station was 24 nm away—and so we don’t know whether the Saratoga was ever in clouds and, if so, for how long. Maneuvering around at low level for nearly an hour in darkness and intermittent IMC would be taxing even for many instrument-rated pilots, and so it seems likely that if the pilot was in clouds at all, it was only for brief periods.

• READ MORE: Fatal Cirrus Accident Shows That Some Knowledge Doesn’t Translate

Two things strike me about this accident. First, how close it came to not happening: If the pilot hadn’t clipped the tree, he might have made the turn to the runway successfully and landed without incident, as he apparently had done in the past. Second, that he had ever managed the trick at all. I can only suppose that the contrast between the runway clear-cut and the surrounding forest was discernible when there was moonlight and that he was able to use GPS and the runway’s end lights to get himself to a position where his landing light would illuminate the runway.

Rugged individualism being, supposedly, an American virtue, I leave it to you to applaud or deplore the nonconformist aspects of this pilot’s actions. Perhaps a certain amount of freelancing is inevitable in an activity like flying. But I deprecate his persistence. One of the essential arrows in every pilot’s quiver should be knowing when to quit. He set himself a nearly impossible goal, and after flying half an hour to his destination, he spent an hour trying to figure out how to get onto the ground.

If it was that difficult, it wasn’t worth doing. There were other airports—with runway lights—nearby.

At the time of the crash, the pilot was awaiting the decision of a Houston court in a wrongful  termination lawsuit that he had filed against a former employer. Five months later, the court found in his favor to the tune of $143 million. Thanks to a terminal case of “get-homeitis,” however, he wasn’t there to enjoy it.

Note: This article is based on the National Transportation Safety Board’s report of the accident and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention. It is not intended to judge or reach any definitive conclusions about the ability or capacity of any person, living or dead, or any aircraft or accessory.

This column first appeared in the May 2024/Issue 948 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post A Cautionary Tale About Pilot Freelancing appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Former United Airlines pilot Bruce Forbes, 66 at the time, initially told authorities the Stearman experienced engine trouble on a sightseeing flight over a lake and he struck power lines while he was trying to troubleshoot the engine issues. On Monday, he pled guilty in federal court to misrepresenting the facts.

• READ MORE: The Stearman Next Door

“I was flying low over the water around the curves of Lake Keystone and struck power lines, causing the plane to crash into the lake,” Forbes told the court. “I believed if I told NTSB investigators the truth, their investigation would find that I was flying in an unsafe manner, and I would have difficulty receiving insurance payments.”

Last December, an Oklahoma grand jury indicted Forbes on two counts of making false statements and one count of obstructing a government proceeding. The indictment cited statements Forbes made to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) between August 27 and September 30, 2022, and alleged false statements on October 2, 2023, to a special agent of the Department of Transportation–Office of the Attorney General.

His passenger, 19-year-old Baily Nevill, told local news outlets that, before the flight, she had not received a safety briefing on how to unfasten her safety belt. Describing the accident, she said Forbes was demonstrating “water dancing” low over the surface of the lake before striking the power lines and crashing into the water.

Nevill said Forbes tried to pull her from her seat, but “we were sideways, and the water was rising. We were in the middle of the lake. He was screaming at me. And once the water got above my chest, Bruce then decided to let go of me and swim away.”

• READ MORE: Stearman Patrol

Nevill was unsure how she finally freed herself from the belt and swam to the surface. Boaters rescued both occupants and brought them safely to shore.

The court has not set a sentencing date, and Forbes could be facing up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. He declined to comment on the case to local news outlets.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post Stearman Pilot Found Guilty of False Statements in Water Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The next day, the wreckage of the 140, its front end crushed, was found a few hundred feet northwest of the pilot’s private strip. Since the flaps were down, it had evidently been approaching to land when it stalled and spun. There was no way to know why the mishap occurred, but the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on the accident noted that conditions were such that carburetor icing was likely.

Stall spins are, and always have been, a common cause of fatalities in general aviation. They often occur during turns at the base-leg end of the pattern. What made this accident a little less usual than most was the history that led up to it.

According to the NTSB, the father, 39, was a student pilot. He had learned to fly from his grandfather, who had no pilot certificate at all. The father began logging time in 2007 and stopped in 2015. He got his last FAA medical in 2014 and his last fight review in 2015. He had a student endorsement for a Cessna 150 but none for the 140. The NTSB estimated his total time as 40 hours, of which 20 were as pilot in command and 20 were in the 140. These estimates were based, apparently, on the fact that the pilot used the 140 to survey local water towers from the air and report levels to their owners.

• READ MORE: Three-Mile Limit: Novice Pilots Succumb to the Perils of Total Darkness

The CFI from whom the pilot had received some flight instruction—and who described him as a “safe pilot”—reported that the pilot knew he was not allowed to carry passengers with a student certificate, but he was “anti-regulation with the government.” The NTSB attributed the accident to the “student pilot’s noncompliance and lack of experience” but noted it was impossible to know who was at the controls at the time of the fatal stall. The father could have been upholding the family tradition by teaching his son to fly.

Three weeks after that accident occurred, a Cessna 421 crashed in a wooded area near the DeLand, Florida, airport (KDED), killing its three occupants. A couple of witnesses saw the airplane flying at low altitude. One, who spotted the airplane on two occasions 10 minutes apart, described the engines on the second sighting as sounding as if they were idling. Another witness reported hearing popping or backfiring sounds. The latter witness also reported the airplane rolled to the left three times before he lost sight of it behind the treetops. It’s not clear whether by “roll” he meant a full roll or, more plausibly, a wing dropping and then coming up again.

The NTSB concluded “it is most likely the pilot lost control of the airplane while maneuvering” and added that the “pilot’s lack of any documented previous training in the accident airplane make and model contributed to his inability to maintain control of the airplane.”

• READ MORE: Fatal Cirrus Accident Shows That Some Knowledge Doesn’t Translate

The pilot of the ill-fated 421 was a 500-hour SMEL CFI. His logbook lacked a “complex airplane” endorsement, but that was probably an oversight. A complex airplane is one with flaps, retractable landing gear, and a variable-pitch propeller. It would be difficult to earn a multiengine rating in an airplane without those features—there aren’t a lot of Champion Lancers left.

As pilots who have flown more than one type of airplane know, the actions required to keep them right side up are alike for all. This 500-hour CFI with 40 hours of logged multiengine time had managed to start the 421’s two GTSO 520s, taxi, take off, and fly for at least 10 minutes. He seemed to have demonstrated an ability to control the airplane.

The 421 had a somewhat checkered recent history. Its last annual inspection had been performed five years earlier, and its Hobbs meter had advanced only four hours in the meantime. Its previous owner had put it up for sale on eBay, and a Texas man had bought it for $35,000, sight unseen, intending to spend a few thousand dollars having it restored to airworthy condition and then resell it. The 50-year-old airframe had, according to aircraft.com, 5,713 hours, and both engines were well short of TBO.

NTSB investigators found nothing to suggest the engines had failed, but the condition of the propeller blades indicated “low rotational energy at impact.” Fire destroyed all fuel tanks, and the NTSB report does not comment on the quantity or quality of fuel residues or the presence or absence of water or other sediment in the engines or what remained of the fuel system.

The Texas A&P whom the owner had engaged to travel to Florida and restore the airplane to airworthy condition had located a pilot to deliver it for $4,500. That pilot, 32, was in the right seat when the crash occurred. With a private certificate and 155 hours, he was even less qualified than the left-seat pilot to fly the 421. The owner declined the suggested pilot and instead gave the job to a certain instructor whose name he did not recall.

• READ MORE: Only Assumptions Can Be Made About What Took Down a Curtiss C-46 in Alaska

Most likely, this was the instructor who was flying the airplane when the accident happened. At the time of the accident the airplane had not yet been signed off by the A&P, and afterward everyone involved denied having any idea what the two pilots and their passenger were doing flying it. The NTSB speculated that the flight was probably of a “personal” nature—that is, a joy ride.

The NTSB blamed both of these accidents on inexperience. Although the South Dakota pilot owned his airplane and had flown, on and off, for a dozen years, his experience had been intermittent. The least one could say is that when the accident occurred, he was more experienced than he had ever been before. As for the other cause cited, noncompliance, it’s hard to see how it qualifies as a cause.

Plenty of experienced and compliant pilots stall and spin, and nobody says they did so because they were too experienced or compliant. In the case of the Florida crash, the NTSB cited the “pilot’s lack of training and experience in the accident airplane make and model.”

The analysis fails to even suggest the possibility of an external cause, such as, say, a partial power loss in the left engine. In fact, as an online bodycam video of the arrival of would-be rescuers at the accident site shows, the airplane came to rest right side up and was not severely fragmented.

Was it really out of control? Or was the pilot valiantly trying to cope with an emergency not of his own making?

Note: This article is based on the National Transportation Safety Board’s report of the accident and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention. It is not intended to judge or reach any definitive conclusions about the ability or capacity of any person, living or dead, or any aircraft or accessory.

This column first appeared in the April 2024/Issue 947 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post Two Fatal Cases of the Simply Inexperienced appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The beauty of the ATD is that scenarios can be created and adjusted to compensate for the learner’s changing skill level. It can also be reset with a few keystrokes, providing a more expedient learning environment. Here are a few scenarios that you might find useful.

Scenario 1: The Pattern

The pattern can be very intimidating to a learner. It can also be dangerous when the learner drops the airplane to fly the checklist or radio, so practice in the ATD is often a good way to learn procedures, as the ATD is a CFI-controlled environment.

To get the most out of the scenario, the learner should use the same procedures in the airplane.

Checklists need to be followed, and the appropriate power settings and aircraft configuration for each leg of the pattern should be called out and applied. Radio calls should be made too.

If the learner is having trouble remembering what comes next, press the pause button and discuss the options. The CFI can increase the complexity of the scenario by changing the winds or refusing to engage the pause button. This is like playing a piece of music on a piano from one end to the other: You may hit some sour notes, but you will learn.

• READ MORE: Healthy Obsession: What Flight Sim Has Done for Me

Pro tip: If the ATD does not have side-view screens, the CFI should remind the learner that each turn they make will be in 90-degree increments. Note the 90-degree marks on the heading indicator as these help with orientation. If utilizing Runway 17 with left traffic, the crosswind turn will be heading 080, downwind 350, base 260, etc. This can be very helpful when the learner goes to unfamiliar airports and isn’t sure what headings to fly in the pattern.

Make sure the learner focuses on altitude control in addition to headings. Don’t accept the excuses of “I can’t fly if I can’t see the runway,” or “I can’t feel the airplane.” It’s an ATD. You’re not supposed to feel it like you do the aircraft, but this can make you a better pilot as you will develop instrument scan and interpretation skills. This can greatly improve landings as you will be ahead of the airplane and nailing the airspeed and attitude on short final.

To change things up, the instructor can program a tailwind so the learner experiences this situation in a controlled environment, where running off the runway isn’t a big deal. We file this scenario under “This Is Why We Shouldn’t Do It.”

Scenario 2: Uncommanded Loss of Engine Power

This is the big kahuna of emergency scenarios, and if it happens in the real world, knowing what to do can be the difference between telling the story in the FBO lobby or having six of your best friends carry you in a box. The beauty of engine issues in the ATD is that they can be sneaky, just like they are in the airplane. Before the learner launches, the instructor can program the engine to lose power several minutes into the flight. This is usually better than tapping at the keyboard during the sim session because that puts the learner on notice that something is about to happen.

In the airplane, loss of engine power in training is done when the instructor pulls the throttle back. Real world, if the engine loses power, the throttle is probably not going to move. This can be confusing to the learner if they have a loss of engine power—they may not recognize it and simply be surprised they are losing altitude because the throttle position hasn’t changed. The ATD scenario fixes this misconception.

• READ MORE: Our Pilots of the Future May Share Sim Stories

Partial power loss scenarios—especially at low altitude—are very useful. If a learner develops good habits for addressing the issue, that behavior will likely be automatic in the airplane. With intermittent power challenges, they should focus on troubleshooting using the appropriate checklist and decision-making skills—should we land or push on? Situational awareness is also stressed: Where is the closest airport?

For best results, don’t give the learner an engine failure on every sim session and mix up 100 percent loss of power with the occasional partial loss. The latter on takeoff is the most important. You don’t have the time or altitude to troubleshoot, so good decision-making and situational awareness is key. Learners can practice pitching for airspeed.

Always brief the land-straight-ahead scenario and at what altitude you will attempt the turn back. If you are flying with another pilot, insist on briefing who-does-what tasks in this situation. One of you needs to fly; the other takes the radios if appropriate.

Scenario 3: VFR into IFR

If you read the accident reports the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) compiles, you will notice a lot are attributed in part to the pilot’s decision to continue VFR into deteriorating weather. In the ATD the scenario begins by having the pilot check the weather before takeoff. The CFI creates a scenario with marginal VFR and a mission, like the pilot who is trying to get their airplane to the maintenance shop because it is about to go out of annual. Talk about how “get-there-itis” can make a pilot do foolish things.

These flights work best if they are limited to an airport 10 to 15 miles away. It’s just a few minutes, right? What could go wrong? Then the CFI slowly brings the weather down. VFR to MVFR…then 2 miles visibility and a ceiling of 1,200 feet agl.

If the pilot does not possess an instrument rating or is out of proficiency, things can go bad rather quickly. You may even put the learner in and out of the clouds.

• READ MORE: Cirrus Adds Second Vision Jet Simulator

In this scenario, the options are a 180-degree turn using only rudder to avoid overbanking—common when you lose the outside horizon reference—to get back to VFR conditions or contacting ATC to ask where the nearest VFR is.

Focus on basic attitude flying using the attitude, airspeed, and heading indicators, or the backup instrument(s). If the aircraft the learner flies in the real world has an autopilot and the ATD has one, teach the learner how to use it. Put the aircraft in level flight to give them a moment to consider their next course of action so they are not anxiously doing climbs, descents, and unplanned turns.

If the learner is not instrument rated but is training at an airport with an instrument approach, this might be a great time to teach them how to fly the approach as an emergency measure. It just might entice the learner to pursue an instrument rating as it will provide extra skills to address this situation and allow them to legally fly in the clouds.

Scenario 4: Crosswinds

If only flight instructors could control the weather, we’d have the learners practicing crosswind takeoffs and landings on a regular basis. But as we can’t in the real world, we set up the ATD for those scenarios, starting with the limitations used for recently soloed learners. It might be no greater than 6 knots with gusts to 10 mph. Usually that limitation is lifted as the learner gains more experience as a pilot. In the ATD, you can change angle with a keystroke, so the learner can experience winds variable between a 45- and 90-degree angle to the flight path.

The demonstrated crosswind component of the aircraft, as noted in the POH for the make and model, should be discussed, and then you can have the student attempt to fly it. Then the CFI should increase the winds so they are 10 knots (or more) above the demonstrated crosswind component.

You might even increase them gradually while having the learner fly the pattern at the airport. If the approaches turn into go-arounds, suggest the learner head to the nearest airport with a crosswind runway, computing the time en route and perhaps getting flight following—the CFI plays ATC at this point. It is important to discuss decision-making in this scenario, and sometimes pilots become so fixated on trying to land that they end up fighting the airplane—or, in this case, the sim when the best course of action is to go to another airport with a more suitable runway alignment.

Scenario 5: Practice Navigation

Getting lost is one of the major phobias of many fledgling pilots. Depending on how sophisticated the ATD graphics are, they can be an excellent tool for teaching basic navigation. Start by having the learner use the compass and teaching UNOS (“undershoot north, overshoot south”) and ANDS (“accelerate north, decelerate south”). Once that is grasped, get sneaky and fail the heading indicator.

Next, introduce the VOR. For this, it is beneficial to pause the device and walk through TIMS: tune it in, identify it by the Morse code, monitor it (listen to the code twice), and then finally set it so the needle centers up with a “From” indication. Why “From”? Because that’s how most of us process geographic relationships. If you asked someone about the nautical-mile distance between Oshkosh and Green Bay in Wisconsin, the answer would be “Oshkosh is 37 nautical miles from Green Bay.”

With a few keystrokes, the CFI can reposition the learner. Have them use the VOR to determine what radial they are on, and if the unit has DME, show you where they are on a sectional. For an extra level of challenge, reposition the virtual airplane and have the learner use the VORs to determine where they are using triangulation.

I don’t allow the learners to use the GPS in the airplane until they’ve learned the other means of navigation. I do not want them to become slaves to the magenta line, but that being said, the use of GPS is critical as you want to avoid the random panic pushing of buttons.

You will see this tendency in the ATD as well, but in the sim you can pause the action then discuss what the learner is trying to accomplish and go through the steps to find the menus and pages.

This is a lesson that should not be rushed. Have the learner go through a flight from start-up to shutdown using the GPS. Note the appropriate checklists, check RAIM if doing instrument approaches, note aircraft performance, and build flight plans. The idea is to learn the procedures in the controlled environment of the ATD, so when the learner gets into the faster-paced, less-forgiving aircraft, they will have a better chance of staying ahead of the airplane.

Remind the learners that GPS is much more than the “Direct To” key, because the direct key and the magenta line will put them through a mountainside or airspace requiring a clearance, so they best have their wits about them and maintain situational awareness.

The Ultimate IFR Scenario

Preparing a learner for their instrument check ride is much more than having them fly a particular profile under a view-limiting device. You’re supposed to be trained for the real world, with all the challenges and decisions that come with it. Do this with a scenario—the difference between a scenario and practice is that, when doing a scenario, the pause button is not allowed. You can’t do it in the airplane, so you can’t do it in the ATD.

This throws down a gauntlet of challenge.

The CFI plays ATC during this scenario, giving the learner their clearances and fielding requests, just as ATC does. Keep it realistic.

Do that in the ATD first by having the learner plan a cross-country flight in it and launch in MVFR but on an IFR flight plan. When they are just about at their destination, the airport is closed—maybe there is a disabled aircraft on the runway—what are the pilot’s options? Should they hold? Divert? The CFI should be prepared for anything, including the random instrument failure.

A Word About Emergencies

It’s a good idea to occasionally drop in a few emergencies during practice or scenarios but not to do them every time. That’s not realistic, or if it is, find a different flight school because that one has serious maintenance issues. There are also some emergencies I file under “I Hope You Never Need to Know This.”

The first one is the jammed elevator. Teach the learner to control the aircraft’s pitch attitude using throttle and trim, and to make the mother of all straight-ins. I compare this maneuver to knowing CPR—I hope I never have to use it, but I am glad I know how to do it.

When we practice a loss of engine power and emergency landing in the real world, we’re usually within gliding distance of an airport. We do clearing turns, identify the emergency landing area, then the maneuver commences. If only the real world was that predictable.

It can be very beneficial for the learner if the CFI fails the engine when the learner is not near an airport—where will they go? Into the trees? Are they over a beach? Can they make it to that grass strip the GPS says is 1.5 miles away? This is an exercise in decision-making. It may be a no-win scenario, or they may be that guy that puts it down in the farm field then lives to share the story.

And one more note about pacing: Some ATDs have the option to change the speed of the scenario. You can make it slow to allow the learner more reaction time, or you can speed it up to create a more challenging experience. If the learner is having difficulty staying ahead of the action, slow it down. If they are ready for a challenge, speed it up.

For best results, always use a syllabus and have an objective when you use the ATD. Finally, make sure you brief the lesson, just like you would in the airplane. Discuss how the scenario will be achieved—and let learning take place.

This column first appeared in the March 2024/Issue 946 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post Flight Sims for the Win: It’s All About Repetition and Drill appeared first on FLYING Magazine.